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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , : Case No. 860052 
- v - : . 
JUAN DIGS CANTU, : Category No. 2 
De fendant -Appe l lan t . : 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s are p r e s e n t e d in t h i s a p p e a l : 
1 . Did t h e t r i a l cour t proper ly deny d e f e n d a n t ' s 
motion for a m i s t r i a l which was premised on the a l l e g a t i o n tha t 
the prosecutor was g u i l t y of purposefu l r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n 
when he s truck a person with a Hispanic surname from the j u r y ? 
2 . Was t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t ev idence t o support 
d e f e n d a n t s c o n v i c t i o n s ? 
3 . Did defendant p r e s e r v e an o b j e c t i o n t o t h e charge 
of aggravated robbery being submit ted t o the jury? 
4 . Did defendant p r e s e r v e an o b j e c t i o n t o the a i d i n g 
and a b e t t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n g i v e n t o the jury? 
5 . Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t proper ly deny d e f e n d a n t ' s 
mot ions t o a r r e s t judgment and t o modify the judgment? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant , Juan Dios Cantu, was charged with aggravated 
robbery , a f i r s t degree f e l o n y , under UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 6 - 6 - 3 0 2 
( 1 9 7 8 ) 9 aggravated b u r g l a r y , a f i r s t degree f e l o n y , under UTAH 
CODE ANN. S 7 6 - 6 - 2 0 3 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , and aggravated a s s a u l t , a t h i r d 
degree f e l o n y , under UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 3 (1978) (R. 1 7 - 1 8 ) . 
A jury found him g u i l t y as charged (R. 32 -34 ) . The t r i a l court 
sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison for concurrent terms 
of f i v e years t o l i f e on the f i r s t degree f e l o n i e s and zero to 
f i v e years on the third degree fe lony; i t a l so ordered him to pay 
r e s t i t u t i o n (R. 139-40A). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
According to the S t a t e ' s chief w i tnes s , Adelia Pippy, a 
68-year-o ld woman, the fol lowing occurred on December 22, 1984 at 
her home in S a l t Lake City. Sometime between 3:30 and 4:00 a.m., 
a man pulled her from her bed t o a point approximately e ight 
inches from h i s face . He then ca l l ed her "an old son of a 
b i t c h , " h i t her head with a club, knifed her in the shoulder, and 
asked her where her gold and s i l v e r was. There appeared to be 
another man standing nearby. With the aid of outside l i g h t s that 
i l luminated her bedroom, Ms. Pippy "got a very good look" at her 
a s s a i l a n t (R. 383-86) . 
After clubbing, knif ing, and pushing Pippy back onto 
her bed, the a s s a i l a n t to ld her not to move and turned on a 
nearby radio. Pippy lay in bed for approximately one hour before 
ge t t ing up and discovering that the men were gone and that the 
front door and window were open. She determined that a number of 
items were missing from her house, including a t e l e v i s i o n , two 
c locks , several coa t s , a w a l l e t , Christmas g i f t s , and some 
porcelain p i e c e s . She a lso discovered a coat containing items 
belonging t o defendant draped over a chair in the kitchen. (R. 
396-420) . 
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Upon contacting the pol ice , Pippy described her 
a s sa i l an t to them as dark complected. From a photo l ineup shown 
to her by the pol ice , she pos i t ive ly ident i f ied defendant as her 
a s s a i l a n t . However, a t an actual l ineup in which defendant 
pa r t i c ipa ted , Pippy did not pick out defendant. She explained a t 
tr ia l t ha t , although she recognized defendant as her a s sa i l an t 
during the l ineup, she believed tha t she was not to choose 
someone unless she was "100 percent" ce r t a in ; a t the time, she 
was only "99 and [44/1001 percent" sure (R. 423-25). Police 
inves t iga tors did find defendant 's f ingerpr in t s on several items 
in Pippy's home (R. 526-34, 590-98). 
At t r i a l , Pippy pos i t ive ly iden t i f i ed defendant as her 
a s s a i l a n t . On cross-examination, she remembered tha t her 
a s sa i l an t had hair to about the bottom of his ears , but she did 
not r eca l l him having a noticeable moustache or beard. When 
shown the photo l ineup by defense counsel, she appeared to 
incor rec t ly identify Exhibit 24 as her a s sa i l an t . However, on 
red i rec t examination, she reaffirmed her i den t i f i ca t ion of 
Exhibit 22, a p ic ture of defendant, as the man who attacked her 
(R. 456-57, 512). 
Defendant took the stand and t e s t i f i e d tha t on December 
22, 1984 he had long ha i r , a moustache, and a long beard. 
According to him, in the early morning hours of tha t day, he had 
pried open a window at Ms. Pippy's home, crawled through i t , and 
opened the front door to l e t in two companions. Once ins ide , he 
took a coat from the c lose t . However, when he heard a person 
snoring in an adjacent room, he and h is companions l e f t . 
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Defendant denied assaul t ing Pippy while he was in her home, 
claiming that he had been there only the one time that night with 
the in tent to obtain a warmer coat. He indicated t h a t , after 
leaving Pippy1s house, one of his companions and another male 
adul t , nei ther of whom had beards, talked about returning to the 
house (R. 735-65). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because defendant f a i l e d t o make a prima f a c i e showing 
of purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor in his use of a 
peremptory challenge, no cons t i tu t iona l v io la t ion occurred when 
the t r i a l court denied de fendan t s motion for a m i s t r i a l . 
The Sta te presented suf f ic ien t evidence to support 
defendant 's convictions of the crimes charged. 
Defendant waived any objection to the charge of 
aggravated robbery being submitted to the j u ry ; moreover, h is 
assignment of error i s contrary to well es tabl ished jud ic i a l 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of "immediate presence." 
By fa i l ing t o make a timely objection to Ins t ruc t ion 
No. 28 a t t r i a l , he i s precluded from having his challenge to 
tha t i n s t ruc t ion considered on appeal. 
Defendant f a i l s to demonstrate tha t the t r i a l court 
abused i t s d i sc re t ion when i t denied h i s p o s t - t r i a l motions to 
a r r e s t judgment and to modify the judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO MAKE A PRIMA 
FACIE SHOWING OF PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION 
BY THE PROSECUTOR IN HIS USE OF A PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGE, NO CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION 
OCCURRED WHEN THE TRIAL COURT DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL. 
At t h e t ime t h e j u r y was s e l e c t e d fo r d e f e n d a n t ' s 
t r i a l , t h e p r o s e c u t o r e x e r c i s e d one of h i s fou r p e r e m p t o r y 
c h a l l e n g e s on a p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r named John Lopez whose a n c e s t r y 
was H i s p a n i c (R. 3 1 , 3 4 5 ) . See Utah R. Crim. P. 1 8 ( d ) (UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 7 7 - 3 5 - 1 8 ( d ) ( 1 9 8 2 ) ) . R e l y i n g p r i m a r i l y on Ba t son v . 
Ken tucky , U .S . , 106 S . C t . 1712 ( 1 9 8 6 ) , d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s 
t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d when i t r e f u s e d t o r e q u i r e t h e 
p r o s e c u t o r t o g i v e h i s r e a s o n s fo r s t r i k i n g a j u r o r who was t h e 
same r a c e a s d e f e n d a n t , and when i t d e n i e d h i s mo t ion f o r a 
m i s t r i a l . He t h e n c o n c l u d e s t h a t , b e c a u s e " t h e p r o s e c u t o r s t r u c k 
w i t h o u t l e g i t i m a t e c a u s e t h e o n l y H i s p a n i c , " d e f e n d a n t ' s " r i g h t 
under t h e S i x t h and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 
C o n s t i t u t i o n and A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 12 of t h e Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n 
t o a t r i a l by an i m p a r t i a l j u r y was v i o l a t e d . " B r . of App. a t 
1 1 . He a s k s t h i s Cour t t o r e v e r s e h i s c o n v i c t i o n s fo r t h i s 
a l l e g e d e r r o r . 
F i r s t , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o do someth ing d e f e n d a n t h a s 
f a i l e d t o do — i . e . , c l e a r l y i d e n t i f y t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b a s i s 
for h i s a r g u m e n t . A l though he b r i e f l y d i s c u s s e s c a s e s t h a t 
a n a l y z e t h e pe rempto ry c h a l l e n g e i s s u e i n t e r m s of t h e f a i r 
c r o s s - s e c t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t c o n t a i n e d i n t h e f e d e r a l and s t a t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n s , e . g . Commonwealth v . S o a r e s , 377 Mass. 4 6 1 , 387 
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N.E.2d 499 (1979); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal. 
Rptr. 890, 583 P. 2d 748 (1978), his clear focus on the Batson 
decision, which is not premised on the sixth amendment but rather 
on the Equal Protection Clause contained in the fourteenth 
amendment, 106 S.Ct. at 1716 n. 4, suggests that he is actually 
making an equal protection argument based on the fourteenth 
amendment. Thus, his reference to the sixth amendment and 
article I, section 12 should be ignored as perhaps the result of 
a less than careful reading of Batson. And because defendant has 
not cited or discussed the equal protection provision in the Utah 
Constitution, UTAH CONST, art. I, § 24, the Court should only 
address the federal equal protection issue he presents.* See 
State v. Dorsey, Utah Sup.Ct. No. 20124, slip op. at 3 n. 2 
(filed December 31, 1986). Cf. State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 
A.2d (1986) (resolving Batson claim on state 
constitutional ground). 
Second, defendant assumes, without discussion, that 
the Batson holaing applies retroactively to his case. The United 
States Supreme Court has already held that Batson does not apply 
retroactively to final convictions that are collaterally attacked 
in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, Allen v. Hardy, U.S. 
, 106 S.Ct. 2878 (1986); and the majority, and better 
reasoned, view is that Batson does not apply to cases pending on 
1
 Defendants citation to UTAH CONST, art. I, § 12 is not 
pertinent, in that Batson, a federal equal protection case, is 
the centerpiece of his argument. Spares and Wheeler are decisions 
expressly grounded on state constitutional law. Furthermore, 
defendant provides no independent analysis of the state 
provision. 
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di rec t appeal and tha t the standard enunciated in Swain v, 
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), should be applied to those cases. 
E. g. Simpson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts! 795 F.2d 216 (1st 
Cir . 1986); People v. Taylor, 146 Il l .App.3d 45
 f 99 111.Dec. 688, 
496 N.E.2d 263, 265-66 (I l l .App. 1986); S ta te v. McClinton, 492 
So.2d 162, 165 n. 2 (La.App. 1986); S ta te v. Hawkins, 347 S.E.2d 
98 (S.C. 1986); S ta te v. Jackson, 343 S. E. 2d 814, 821-26 (N.C. 
1986). £ut see Wise v. S t a t e , 179 Ga.App. 115, 346 S.E.2d 393 
(1986) (which appears to give Batson re t roac t ive appl icat ion on 
d i rec t appeal) . Indeed, although the majority opinion was s i l en t 
on the quest ion, four of the j u s t i c e s in Batson concluded tha t i t 
should not have re t roac t ive appl ica t ion . 106 S.Ct. a t 1725 
(White, J . , concurring); 106 S.Ct. a t 1731 (O'Connor, J . , 
concurring); 106 S.Ct. a t 1740 (Burger, C.J . , with Rehnquist, J . , 
d i s sen t ing ) . I t appears the question wi l l be f i na l ly decided in 
two cases where c e r t i o r a r i was recently granted — Gri f f i th v. 
Kentucky, U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 2274 (1986); and Brown v. 
United S t a t e s , 770 F.2d 912, c e r t , granted, U.S. , 106 
S.Ct. 2275 (1986). By the time t h i s Court i ssues an opinion in 
the ins tan t case, i t may well have the benefit of a ruling on the 
r e t r o a c t i v i t y issue from the Supreme Court; however, un t i l the 
Supreme Court ru l e s , the Swain standard concerning a prosecutor ' s 
use of peremptory challenges, which Batson overruled, should be 
applied here. 
In Swain, the Court recognized tha t a " S t a t e ' s 
purposeful or de l ibera te denial to Negroes on account of race of 
pa r t i c ipa t i on as ju ro r s in the administrat ion of j u s t i ce v i o l a t e s 
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the Equal Protection Clause." 380 U.S. at 203-04. As summarized 
by the Batson Court: 
To preserve the peremptory nature of 
the prosecutor's chal lenge , the 
Court in Swain decl ined t o s c r u t i n i z e 
h i s ac t ions in a part icular case by 
relying on a presumption that he 
properly exerc i sed the S t a t e ' s cha l lenges . 
Id. at 221-222, 85 S.Ct. at 836-37. 
The Court went on to observe, however, 
that a s t a t e may not exerc i se i t s 
chal lenges in contravention of the 
Equal Protect ion Clause. I t was 
impermissible for a prosecutor to use 
h i s chal lenges to exclude blacks from 
the jury "for reasons wholly unrelated 
to the outcome of the part icular case 
on t r i a l " or to deny to blacks "the 
same r ight and opportunity to par t i c ipa te 
in the administration of j u s t i c e enjoyed 
by the white population." i d . at 224, 85 
S.Ct. at 838. Accordingly, a black 
defendant could make out a prima f a c i e 
case of purposeful discriminat ion on 
proof that the peremptory challenge 
system was "being perverted" in that 
manner. Ibid. For example, an inference 
of purposeful discr iminat ion would be 
raised on evidence that a prosecutor, 
*in case after case , whatever the 
circumstances, whatever the crime and 
whoever the defendant or the vict im may 
be, i s responsible for the removal of 
Negroes who have been s e l e c t e d as 
q u a l i f i e d jurors by the jury commissioners 
and who have survived chal lenges for cause, 
with the r e s u l t that no Negroes ever serve 
on p e t i t j u r i e s . " i d . , at 223, 85 S.Ct. at 
837. Evidence offered by the defendant 
in Swain did not meet that standard. 
While the defendant showed that prosecutors 
in the j u r i s d i c t i o n had exerc i sed their 
s t r i k e s to exclude blacks from the jury, 
he offered no proof of the circumstances 
under which prosecutors were responsible 
for s t r ik ing black jurors beyond the f a c t s 
of h i s own case , i d . , at 224-228, 85 S.Ct. 
at 838-40. 
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106 S.Ct. at 1720. Defendant's cons t i tu t iona l claim should be 
analyzed under t h i s standard. 
In the t r i a l court, there was no dispute that defendant 
was a Hispanic. However, the s i t u a t i o n was not so c lear with 
respect to prospective juror Lopez. When defendant's counsel 
asked Lopez and another venireperson to ra i se the ir hand if they 
considered themselves a member of a racial minority such as 
"Aleut Eskimo, American Indian, Asian, Hispanic or black,11 
neither raised a hand (R. 345) . I t was not unt i l defense counsel 
s p e c i f i c a l l y questioned Lopez about poss ib le Hispanic ancestry 
that he acknowledged having that background (R. 345) . This 
suggests that , even though Lopez had a Hispanic surname, he did 
not ident i fy c l o s e l y with Hispanics as a d i s t i n c t i v e group in the 
community. Cf. People v. Harris , 36 Cal. 3d 36, 201 Cal. Rptr. 
782, 679 P.2d 433, 440-41 (1984) (recognizing that Hispanics 
share with other members of their group a common perspect ive 
ar i s ing from the ir l i f e experience in the group). Nevertheless , 
for purposes of his claim that there was a c lear inference of 
racial d iscr iminat ion when the prosecutor peremptorily challenged 
Lopez, defendant a s s e r t s without q u a l i f i c a t i o n that Lopez was a 
Hispanic and i m p l i c i t l y concludes that he therefore shared the 
unique perspect ive of the Hispanic group in the community. 
In addit ion t o the exclus ion of Lopez by the 
prosecution, defendant offered the t r i a l court further evidence 
of the prosecutor's a l l eged discriminatory use of a peremptory 
chal lenge in the form of testimony from several defense 
at torneys . Those attorneys general ly t e s t i f i e d that very few 
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minority persons ac tua l ly served on a jury in the numerous 
criminal t r i a l s they had handled, and that minor i t i e s were 
regularly removed by Salt Lake County prosecutors through the 
e x e r c i s e of peremptory chal lenges (R. 274-87, 466-79) . 
For the very same reason that the defendant did not 
prevail in Swain, defendant should not prevail here. In short f 
he offered no proof to the t r i a l court of the circumstances under 
which prosecutors were responsible for s t r ik ing minor i t i es beyond 
the f a c t s of h i s own case — i . e. , proof that would demonstrate a 
systematic e x e r c i s e of peremptory chal lenges by the State to 
exclude m i n o r i t i e s from j u r i e s on account of race. Admittedly, 
t h i s i s a heavy burden of proof, but many lower courts have 
interpreted Swain as requiring a defendant to present evidence of 
repeated s t r ik ing of minor i t i e s over a number of cases before an 
equal protec t ion v i o l a t i o n could be e s t a b l i s h e d . See Batson, 106 
S.Ct. at 1720. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , in Batson the Supreme Court did 
not quest ion the reasoning of those lower court d e c i s i o n s , and 
appeared to overrule Swain because i t s e t forth t h i s now 
unacceptable evident iary formulation for assess ing a prima f a c i e 
case under the Equal Protect ion Clause. Id . at 1721-25. 
Furthermore, the circumstances of the prosecutor 's 
s ing l e peremptory s t r ike of a person with a Hispanic surname in 
defendant's case did not give r i s e to a c lear inference of 
purposeful discriminat ion based on race. As previously noted, 
Mr. Lopez's i n i t i a l reluctance to c a l l himself a Hispanic 
suggests a lack of i d e n t i t y with the perspect ive of that minority 
group even though he had a Hispanic surname — a factor that 
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t ends t o i n d i c a t e t h a t the prosecutor may have had reasons o ther 
than Lopez ' s Hispanic ances t ry for s t r i k i n g him from the j u r y . 
Indeed, t h i s c i rcumstance concerning Lopez might very well 
prevent defendant from making out a prima f a c i e case of 
purposeful d i s c r i m i n a t i o n under the more l e n i e n t s t andard adopted 
in Batson , 106 S.Ct. a t 1722-23, under which a defendant , in 
order t o e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e ca se , must show: (1) " t h a t he i s 
a member of a cognizable r a c i a l group • . • and t h a t the 
p rosecu tor has exe rc i s ed peremptory cha l l enges t o remove from the 
v e n i r e members of the d e f e n d a n t ' s r a c e ; " and (2) t h a t the f a c t s 
and c i rcumstances " r a i s e an in fe rence t h a t the p rosecu tor used 
(peremptory cha l l enges ] t o exclude the veniremen from the p e t i t 
ju ry on account of t h e i r r a c e . " Even under Batson, removal of a 
minor i ty from the ju ry does no t , by i t s e l f , r a i s e an in fe rence of 
r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . P h i l l i p s v . S t a t e , 496 N.E.2d a t 89. 
In conc lus ion , Batson should not be app l i ed 
r e t r o a c t i v e l y t o d e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e . Because defendant f a i l e d t o 
ca r ry the burden s e t f o r t h in Swain, the t r i a l cour t proper ly 
refused t o r e q u i r e the p rosecu tor t o exp la in h i s s t r i k i n g of 
Lopez and c o r r e c t l y denied d e f e n d a n t ' s motion for a m i s t r i a l . 
POINT I I 
DEFENDANT'S INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
CLAIM IS WITHOUT MERIT 
When cons ide r ing a cha l lenge t o t h e su f f i c i ency of t he 
evidence, t h i s Court has a p p l i e d the fo l lowing s tandard of 
review: 
This Court will not lightly overturn the 
findings of a jury. We must view the 
evidence properly presented at trial in 
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the l i g h t most favorable to the j u r y ' s 
v e r d i c t , and wi l l only i n t e r f e r e when the 
evidence i s so lacking and insubstant ia l 
that a reasonable man could not poss ib ly 
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. We a l so view in a l i g h t most 
favorable to the j u r y ' s verdict those 
f a c t s which can be reasonably inferred 
from the evidence presented t o i t . 
S t a t e v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982) ( c i t a t i o n s 
omit ted) . As noted in State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985): 
In reviewing the convic t ion , we do not 
s u b s t i t u t e our judgment for that of the 
jury. "It i s the e x c l u s i v e function of 
the jury to weigh the evidence and to 
determine the c r e d i b i l i t y of the 
wi tnesses . . . ." State v. Lamm, Utah, 
606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); accord State v. 
Linden, Utah 657 P.2d 1264, 1366 (1983). 
So long as there i s some evidence, including 
reasonable in ferences , from which f indings 
of a l l the r e q u i s i t e elements of the crime 
can reasonably be made, our inquiry s tops . 
Id, at 345 ( c i t a t i o n omitted) . And, even if the Court views the 
evidence as l e s s than wholly conc lus ive , or i f contradictory 
evidence or c o n f l i c t i n g inferences e x i s t , the verdic t should be 
upheld. State v. Howell, 649 P. 2d 9 1 , 97 (Utah 1982) . In short , 
"on c o n f l i c t i n g evidence the Court i s obl iged to accept the 
vers ion of the f a c t s which supports the v e r d i c t . " State v. 
Isaacson, 704 P.2d 555, 556 (Utah 1985) ( c i t i n g State v. Howell, 
649 P.2d at 9 3 ) . 
The evidence presented by the State at t r i a l i s 
summarized in t h i s b r i e f ' s statement of f a c t s . Under the 
foregoing standards of review, that evidence, although not 
overwhelming, was s u f f i c i e n t to support defendant's conv ic t ions . 
Defendant's i n s u f f i c i e n c y argument i s l i t t l e more than a request 
for t h i s Court to engage in de novo review of the weight of the 
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evidence and the c r e d i b i l i t y of the witnesses, and then to 
s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment for that of the jury . In brief, he asks 
the Court to believe h i s story and disbel ieve the testimony of 
the S t a t e ' s chief witness, Ms. Pippy. As i s evident from the 
au thor i ty c i ted above, the Court has repeatedly s ta ted t ha t i t 
wil l not review a criminal case in that fashion. 
F ina l ly , cer ta in port ions of defendant 's argument on 
t h i s point require a brief response in order to c la r i fy the 
s i tua t ion a t t r i a l . F i r s t , defendant contends t ha t the photo 
l ineup shown to the victim was impermissibly suggestive and 
therefore the i den t i f i ca t ion of defendant made from i t was not 
r e l i a b l e evidence. This contention should not even be 
considered, in tha t defendant never made tha t objection, e i ther 
before or during t r i a l , to the admission of testimony concerning 
the l ineup. See Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) & (d) (UTAH CODE ANN. 
S 77-35-12(b) (2) & (d) (1982)); Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) ; S ta te v. 
Heaps, 711 P. 2d 257, 259-60 (Utah 1985). In the absence of a 
timely objection to that evidence, defendant may not now argue 
tha t the evidence was insuf f ic ien t to support h i s conviction 
because i t was infirm. 
Second, defendant 's a t tacks on the eyewitness 
i den t i f i c a t i on testimony given by the victim are made without 
d isc losure to the Court tha t defendant 's requested cautionary 
eyewitness i den t i f i ca t i on in s t ruc t ion , patterned after the one 
recommended in United S ta tes v. Te l fa i re , 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 
1972), was given to the jury before i t began i t s de l ibera t ions 
(see Ins t ruc t ion No. 29, R. 69; Defendant's Requested Ins t ruc t ion 
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No. 5 , R. 8 7 ) . £ f . S t a t e v . Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) . 
T h e r e f o r e , the j u r o r s had s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n s on the f a c t o r s t o 
c o n s i d e r i n de termin ing t h e accuracy of the v i c t i m ' s 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of defendant a s the p e r p e t r a t o r of the cr imes 
charged. I t i s for the j u r y , and not for t h i s Court , t o a s s e s s 
the v i c t i m ' s t e s t imony and t o weigh whatever i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s were 
apparent in i t . Un le s s t h e t e s t imony i s w h o l l y improbable , t h e 
Court w i l l not d i s t u r b the judgment reached i n the t r i a l c o u r t . 
S t a t e v . La irbv , 699 P.2a 1187 , 1206 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) . Given t h e 
e x i s t e n c e of c o r r o b o r a t i n g p h y s i c a l ev idence ( e . g . , the p r e s e n c e 
of d e f e n d a n t ' s c o a t and h i s f i n g e r p r i n t s in t h e v i c t i m ' s h o u s e ) , 
the v i c t i m ' s t e s t imony cannot be f a i r l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d as w h o l l y 
improbable . 
Third, d e f e n d a n t ' s r e f e r e n c e s t o S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t s 22 
and 24 (photographs t h a t were part of the photo l i n e u p shown t o 
t h e v i c t i m ) (Addendum F t o d e f e n d a n t ' s b r i e f ) and t o a t r a n s c r i p t 
of the l i n e u p a t t e n d e d by the v i c t i m (Addendum A t o de fendant ' 
b r i e f ) a r e i n a p p r o p r i a t e , in t h a t none of t h o s e i t ems has been 
made a part of the record on a p p e a l . This Court has c o n s i s t e n t l y 
re fused t o review m a t e r i a l s not i n c l u d e d i n t h e record on a p p e a l . 
E .g . L a i r b v , 699 P.2d a t 1 1 9 2 , 1 2 0 2 - 0 3 . 
POINT I I I 
DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO THE 
CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY GOING TO 
THE JURY; MOREOVER, THIS ASSIGNMENT 
OF ERROR LACKS MERIT. 
Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t erred i n a l l o w i n g 
the charge of aggravated robbery t o go t o the j u r y because the 
S t a t e p r e s e n t e d no e v i d e n c e "that anyth ing was taken from t h e 
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person of the v ict im or from her immediate presence by means of 
force or f e a r . " Br. of App. at 23. However, defendant waived 
t h i s argument by f a i l i n g t o make a timely object ion at t r i a l . He 
made no object ion at t r i a l t o the in s t ruc t ions on robbery being 
submitted t o the jury (R. 809) . In f a c t , he requested an 
in s t ruc t ion on robbery (see Defendant's Requested Instruct ion No. 
15 , R. 98) which, as noted by defense counsel (R. 808) , was 
s imilar to the ones requested by the State and given by the court 
(see S t a t e ' s Requested Instruct ion No. 6 , R. 110; Instruct ion No. 
13; R. 51) . He also did not object to the addit ional ins truct ion 
on "immediate presence" the court gave the jury after i t had 
re t i red to de l iberate (R. 873-74) . Under these circumstances, 
defendant waived any object ion to the jury being instructed on 
aggravated robbery. State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 
1985) ( c i t ing State v. Kazda, 545 P.2d 190 (Utah 1976) ) ; Utah R. 
Crim. P. 19(c) (UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-19 (c) (1982)) . Although 
he did ra i se the i s sue in a p o s t - t r i a l motion, that did not 
preserve the i s s u e for appeal. S ta te v. Erickson, 722 P.2d 756, 
759 (Utah 1986) . 
Moreover, defendant's argument lacks merit . The 
evidence presented most cer ta in ly proved the element of taking 
property from the person or immediate presence of the v ict im by 
force or fear . As noted in Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 473 
at 51-52 (14th ed. 1981): 
For the purpose of robbery, property i s 
deemed to be within a v i c t i m ' s "presence" 
when i t i s within his control . As one 
court has put i t : "A thing i s in the 
presence of a person, in respect to 
robbery, which i s so within h i s reach, 
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i n s p e c t i o n , o b s e r v a t i o n or c o n t r o l , 
t h a t he c o u l d , i f not overcome w i t h 
v i o l e n c e or prevented by f e a r , r e t a i n h i s 
p o s s e s s i o n of i t . " In accordance wi th 
t h i s t e s t , property i s deemed t o be i n 
a v i c t i m ' s presence even though i t i s 
l o c a t e d i n another room of the h o u s e , or 
i n another b u i l d i n g on h i s p r e m i s e s . 
A defendant i s g u i l t y of robbery when, 
a f t e r p u t t i n g a v i c t i m in f e a r , he d r i v e s 
away h i s c a t t l e , or when, a f t e r f o r c i n g 
a v i c t i m t o open h i s desk or s a f e , he takes 
papers there from. 
A defendant i s l i k e w i s e g u i l t y of robbery 
when, by the use of f o r c e or t h r e a t e n e d 
f o r c e , he compels a v i c t i m t o l e a v e the 
room or p lace where t h e money or property 
i s l o c a t e d and then , i n the v i c t i m ' s 
a b s e n c e , t a k e s t h e money or p r o p e r t y . 
[ F o o t n o t e s o m i t t e d . ] 
See a l s o S t a t e v . U l i b a r r i , 668 P.2d 568 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) ; P e r k i n s and 
Boyce , Criminal Law 346-47 (3d e d . 1 9 8 2 ) . 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT WAIVED THE OBJECTION TO 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 8 HE RAISES ON APPEAL 
At t r i a l , when g i v e n the o p p o r t u n i t y t o take e x c e p t i o n s 
t o t h e jury i n s t r u c t i o n s , de fense counse l s t a t e d : 
Your Honor, the d e f e n s e would take e x c e p t i o n 
on ly t o t h o s e g i v e n which are p a r t y ' s [ s i c ] 
i n s t r u c t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g e l ement s of each of 
the o f f e n s e s as w e l l as t h e s e p a r a t e c u l p a b i l i t y 
d e f i n i t i o n of p a r t i e s . I th ink t h e y ' r e the 
on ly e x c e p t i o n s t h a t we would t a k e . 
(R. 6 4 9 ) . On a p p e a l , defendant contends t h a t the t r i a l court 
e r r e d i n g i v i n g I n s t r u c t i o n No. 28 (R. 6 8 ) , an a i d i n g and 
a b e t t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n drawn from UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 6 - 2 - 2 0 2 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 
because t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e t o support such an i n s t r u c t i o n . 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 1 9 ( c ) p r o v i d e s : 
No p a r t y may a s s i g n a s e r r o r any p o r t i o n of 
t h e c h a r g e or o m i s s i o n t h e r e f r o m u n l e s s he 
o b j e c t s t h e r e t o b e f o r e t h e j u r y i s i n s t r u c t e d , 
s t a t i n g d i s t i n c t l y t h e m a t t e r t o which he 
o b j e c t s and t h e ground of h i s o b j e c t i o n . 
N o t w i t h s t a n a i n g a p a r t y ' s f a i l u r e t o o b j e c t , 
e r r o r may be a s s i g n e d t o i n s t r u c t i o n s i n 
o r d e r t o a v o i d a m a n i f e s t i n j u s t i c e . 
[Emphasis a d d e d . ] 
Defense c o u n s e l ' s s t a t e d o b j e c t i o n does n o t c o n t a i n any r e f e r e n c e 
t o l a c k of e v i d e n c e a s a b a s i s f o r o p p o s i n g an a i d i n g and 
a b e t t i n g i n s t r u c t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , under Rule 1 9 ( c ) , d e f e n d a n t i s 
p r e c l u d e d from r a i s i n g t h a t o b j e c t i o n t o I n s t r u c t i o n No. 28 f o r 
t h e f i r s t t i m e on a p p e a l . See Noren , 704 P. 2d a t 5 7 1 ; Kazda 545 
P .2d a t 1 9 2 - 9 2 . N o t h i n g s u g g e s t s t h a t m a n i f e s t i n j u s t i c e would 
occu r i f t h e a l l e g e d i n s t r u c t i o n a l e r r o r i s n o t r ev iewed by t h e 
Cour t b e c a u s e of w a i v e r . Cf. S t a t e v . L e s l e y , 672 P. 2d 7 9 , 81 
(Utah 1983) 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
POST-TRIAL MOTIONS TO ARREST JUDGMENT AND 
TO MODIFY THE JUDGMENT. 
Defendan t c l a i m s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n n o t 
g r a n t i n g e i t h e r of h i s p o s t - t r i a l m o t i o n s — one t o a r r e s t 
judgment and t h e o t h e r t o modify t h e j u d g m e n t . However, in 
t a k i n g t h i s p o s i t i o n , d e f e n d a n t f a i l s t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e 
c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n . 
Utah R. Crim. P. 23 (UTAH CODE ANN. S 7 7 - 3 5 - 2 3 (1982) ) 
p r o v i d e s : 
At any time prior to the imposition of 
sentence, the court upon its own initiative 
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, 
arrest judgment if the facts proved or 
-17-
admitted do not c o n s t i t u t e a public o f fense f 
or the defendant i s mentally i l l , or there 
i s other good cause for the arrest of 
judgment. Upon arrest ing judgment the court 
mayr unless a judgment of acqui t ta l of the 
offense charged i s entered or jeopardy has 
attached, order a commitment unt i l the 
defendant i s charged anew or r e t r i e d f or may 
enter any other order as may be jus t and 
proper under the circumstances. 
The obvious purpose of that rule i s t o protect a defendant from 
an incorrect jury verd ic t when the evidence did not e s t a b l i s h 
that an offense had been committed, or when there i s evidence 
that due to mental i l l n e s s the defendant was unable to form the 
mental s t a t e required for commission of the crime or was 
incompetent to stand t r i a l . Defendant made neither of these 
showings in the t r i a l court (R. 880-909) , and he does not do so 
here. Therefore, the t r i a l court properly denied h i s motion to 
arrest judgment. See State v. Lairbyy 699 P.2d at 1203. 
Defendant's further assignment of error regarding the 
c o u r t ' s refusal to modify the judgment from g u i l t y to g u i l t y and 
mentally i l l may be disposed of summarily. F i r s t , prior to the 
return of v e r d i c t s in h i s case , defendant never raised an i s sue 
about defendant's poss ib l e mental i l l n e s s or requested an 
i n s t r u c t i o n on g u i l t y and mentally i l l v e r d i c t s . See Utah R. 
Crim. P. 21 (UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-21 (1982)) . Second, h i s 
claim of error i s r e a l l y an attack on the cour t ' s dec i s ion t o 
sentence defendant pursuant to the gu i l ty v e r d i c t s returned 
rather than sentencing him in accordance with the provis ions of 
Utah R. Crim. P. 21.5 (UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-21.5 (Supp. 1986)) 
re la t ing t o a g u i l t y and mentally i l l verd ic t . Because the court 
imposed sentences that were within the l i m i t s prescribed by law 
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and t h e r e i s no showing t h a t i t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n doing 
s o , t h i s Court should not d i s t u r b the s e n t e n c i n g d e c i s i o n , s t a t e 
v . P e t e r s o n , 681 P.2d 1210 , 1219 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) ; S t a t e v . McKenna. 
45 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 , 1 1 , P.2d , ( 1 9 8 6 ) ; S t a t e v . 
S h e l b y . 45 Utah Adv. Rep. 1 1 , P. 2d ( 1 9 8 6 ) . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the f o r e g o i n g arguments, d e f e n d a n t ' s 
c o n v i c t i o n s should be a f f i r m e d . __. 
RESPECTFULLY submit ted t h i s _° day of January, 1 9 8 7 . 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
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